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ATTACK VECTORS AGAINST SOCIAL NETWORKING SYSTEMS: 
THE FACEBOOK EXAMPLE 
 
Matthew Warren, Shona Leitch and Ian Rosewall, 





Social networking systems (SNS’s) such as Facebook are an ever evolving and developing means of social 
interaction, which is not only being used to disseminate information to family, friends and colleagues but as a 
way of meeting and interacting with "strangers" through the advent of a large number of social applications. The 
attractiveness of such software has meant a dramatic increase in the number of frequent users of SNS’s and the 
threats which were once common to the Internet have now been magnified, intensified and altered as the potential 
for criminal behaviour on SNS’s increases. Social networking sites including Facebook contain a vast amount of 
personal information, that if obtained could be used for other purposes or to carry out other crimes such as 
identity theft. This paper will focus on the security threats posed to social networking sites and gain an 
understanding of these risks by using a security approach known as “attack trees”. This will allow for a greater 
understanding of the complexity associated with protecting Social Networking systems with a particular focus on 
Facebook. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The emergence of Web 2.0 and related Internet sites such as Facebook has had a major impact upon the Internet 
in recent years. One of the interesting aspects of Facebook is the use of third party applications and the 
interactions that this allows. This means that individual Facebook pages now act as a web page, blog, instant 
messenger, email system and the use of third party applications allows for real time functionality (DiMicco & 
Millen, 2007; Shuen, 2008).  
In a generic context, social networking sites (SNS’s) are virtual spaces where people congregate to discuss ideas, 
share information and communicate (Raacke & Bonds-Raacke, 2008). The reasons for the popularity of SNS’s 
are varied and include (Lampe et al, 2007): 
• To communicate and keep in touch with friends (as a way of supporting pre-existing 
friendships;  
• To make new friends and build social relationships; 
• To promote oneself. 
 
This new way to communicate and share information has highlighted new and more profound security and 
privacy concerns than were encountered during the initial Internet boom period. This paper proposes the use of 
attack trees to understand the security threat of networks, in terms of this paper the focus will be upon Facebook. 
The paper will discuss the security issues of social networking, the security issues of Facebook, the development 
of attack trees and an analysis of the Facebook security example using attack tree analysis. 
SOCIAL NETWORKING AND SECURITY ISSUES  
In a SNS context there are of a number of key security and privacy issues, these are (Boyd, 2008; Dwyer et al, 
2007; Shin, 2010): 
 Security: In SNS’s, security refers to users’ perception on security; that is perceived security which is 
defined as the extent to which a user believes that using a SNS application will be risk-free; 
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 Privacy: In a SNS context privacy can be defined as control over the flow of one’s personal 
information, including the transfer and exchange of that information. Privacy within SNS’s is often not 
expected or is undefined; 
 Trust: Trust in a SNS is defined as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party. In a SNS, trust is a critical determinant 
of sharing information and developing new relationships. 
 
The fabric of SNS’s enable viruses, malware and Trojans to thrive on their ability to access personal information 
or cause password attacks leading to a breach of network security. SNS’s also open the gates for cybercriminals 
and sexual predators and this is likely to become a major issue for the future. Increased use of SNS’s such as 
Facebook increase the chance of malware or peer phishing attacks that can potentially cause serious damage to 
organisational data security (Socialman, 2009).  For example there were concerns over a data leak after a hacker 
broke into the ‘Top Friends’ application on Facebook making users private information visible (Goldie, 2008). 
In 2009 a worm named Koobface spread quickly through Facebook; this particular worm stole personal 
information in a much more sophisticated way then has been seen before The worm could register itself on 
Facebook, add random strangers as friends and post messages on the  their “walls” which would provide links to 
malware (Sophos, 2010). It continued its effect on the SNS’s by spreading to other sites which compounded the 
effects (Luo et al, 2009). 
PRIOR RESEARCH INTO FACEBOOK SECURITY CONCERNS 
Earlier research into the security issues surrounding Facebook identified a number of unique security concerns 
(Leitch and Warren, 2009). Since that earlier research, a new key feature of Facebook has been developed, the 
federated login via Facebook connect. This means that logging in though Facebook gives users the ability to 
share information, in particular (Facebook, 2010): 
Real Identity 
Facebook users represent themselves with their real names and real identities. With Facebook Connect, users can 
take their real identity information with them wherever they go on the Internet including; basic profile 
information, profile picture, name, friends, photos, events, and groups. 
Friends Access 
Many people rely on Facebook to stay connected to their friends and family. With Facebook Connect, these 
users can continue to connect with their friends elsewhere on the Internet. Developers are able to add rich social 
context to their websites and can even dynamically show which of their Facebook friends already have accounts 
on their sites. 
Dynamic Privacy 
As a user moves around the open Internet, their privacy settings will follow, ensuring the users' information and 
privacy rules are always up-to-date. For example, if a user changes their profile picture, or removes a friend 
connection, this will be automatically updated in the external website. An example of the Facebook 





Figure 1. Connecting to Digg via Facebook 
According to Facebook (Facebook, 2011): 
 Since Facebook connect plugins launched in April 2010 an average of 10,000 new websites integrate 
with Facebook every day;  
 More than 2.5 million websites have integrated with Facebook (via Facebook Connect), including over 
80 of comScore's U.S. Top 100 websites and over half of comScore's Global Top 100 websites. 
 
This means that if Facebook user credentials are compromised then access to other sites is also enabled and that 
a user’s online identity can be assumed. This is the driver for attacks on Facebook and attacks on Facebook user 
credentials. 
ATTACK TREE DIAGRAMS 
Attacks tree are a method of graphically representing the possible attacks against a system via the use of an 
attack tree diagram which is similar to a structured tree diagram. Prior research (Mauw and Oostdijk, 2005) 
determined that the graphical, structured tree diagram notation is appealing to practitioners, yet also seems 
promising for tool builders attempting to partially automate the threat analysis process. As such, attack trees may 
turn out to be of interest to the security community at large as a standard notation for threat analysis documents. 
The notion and concept of attack trees was introduced by a number of key researchs such as, Schneier (Schneier 
1999; 2000) and (Amoroso, 1994). 
Previous researchers (Dimitriadis, 2007; Schneier, 1999) have put forward a case that attack trees provide a 
formal methodology for analysing the security of systems and subsystems and that they provide a different way 
to think about security; which include security capture and the ability to reuse expertise about security as well as 
responding to changes in security. An attack tree has a root node and leaf nodes. The root node represents the 
target of the attack, while the leaf nodes represent the means for reaching the target, which are the events that 
comprise the attack.  
The attack tree approach has been used in a number of different security situations, from the Critical 
Infrastructure (SCADA) (Byres et al, 2004) domain to commercial security environments (Internet banking) 
(Dimitriadis, 2007). The use of attack trees has been shown to be very flexible and is able to deal with complex 
situations, hence the authors decision to use this approach. The authors propose that the attack tree model may be 




FACEBOOK CASE STUDY 
The case study used focused on the use of the social networking site, Facebook and draws attention to the 
particular security risks and issues of that SNS. The authors used the same approach when analysing Facebook 
that Dimitriadis (2007) applied in his study where attack trees were used to try and determine the particular 
security requirements of Internet Banking.  
The stages of development were: 
1. The identification of the known security risks that impact Facebook. Previous research by Leitch and 
Warren (2009) identified the security threat dimensions most commonly encountered in Facebook by 
modeling them in a Security Threat Matrix (STM); this was summarised later in the paper. The security 
risks identified were then used as the source information to be analysed in the current research to form the 
attack tree diagrams; 
2. Development of the attack tree model to illustrate the high level security threats and issues that impact 
Facebook. 
Eight security threat dimensions were considered based on the STM (Leitch and Warren, 2009) and an attack 
tree diagram was created for each threat. 
One of the major issues that were identified as a security threat in Facebook was the compromising of user 
credentials (Leitch and Warren, 2009) to gain access to individuals Facebook pages (this may be related to the 
recent development of the federated login approach). These attacks occur because individuals either guessed, 
used technology or human means to compromise the credentials. 
The attack tree modelling and implementation of the suggested countermeasures will help to mitigate the threat 
of the following security and misuse issues in relation to Facebook (Leitch and Warren, 2009): 
 
Facebook Security Threat Dimension  
I. Privacy & Confidentiality  
II. Authentication & Identity Theft 
IV. Vandalism, Harassment & Stalking 
VII. Payment and Transaction Integrity 
VIII. Malwares and Computer Virus 
The attack tree diagram representing one of Facebook’s main security risks is shown in Figure 2. The bull’s-eye 
symbol in the figure is used to illustrate where suggested security countermeasures are linked to a particular 






Figure 2.Attack Tree Matrix for Facebook 
 
The abuse of user credentials as a means to compromise a Facebook account encompasses a number of different 
aspects and specific risks. These are outlined in Figure 2 (and explained below); these are the leaves of the attack 
tree diagram. 
User Credential Compromise – Other Forms 
The theft of handwritten notes containing password details, e.g. sticky notes on the computer. 
User Credential Compromise – Malicious Software Installation – Vulnerability Exploits 
The installation of software onto a computer to gain access to a user’s credentials. This could compromise the 
user’s login information and password, e g. through the use of keyboard loggers, screen capture, etc. This could 
also be a threat due to the third party applications used within Facebook. 
Malicious Software Installation – Vulnerability Exploits 
This is the use of hidden code within a webpage that exploits a known vulnerability to install malicious code. An 
alternative attack approach could be the use of worms that searches for vulnerabilities and exploits them 
automatically. This could also be an issue with the third party applications used with the Facebook system. 
Malicious Software Installation – Other Forms 
This relates to the installation of malicious code via email. The malicious code is sent as an attachment and the 
user accidently installs the code on their machine. 
User Credential Compromise – User Communication with Attack - Redirection 
A key issue is the manipulation of third party applications used with the Facebook system and the redirection of 
users to malicious sites and away from the Facebook environment.  
User Credential Compromise –User Communication with Attack – Other Forms 
These attacks could take the form of social engineering, such as fake Facebook friends trying to obtain 
information via emails, phone calls, etc. Another issue is the manipulation of third party applications used with 
the Facebook system and the communication and exchange of information through those channels. 
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User Credential Guessing 
This is the use of technology to randomly generate usernames or passwords. In the Facebook example this could 
also include the accessing of the “secret question” in order to generate a new password and gain access to the 
Facebook account.  
This part of the paper has defined the security threats that impact Facebook, the usage of the attack tree diagram 
approach to map those security threats and suitable security countermeasures that can assist in the mitigation of 
these threats. 
DISCUSSION 
Prior research into the most widely concerning security threats in Facebook and the subsequent use of the 
research to develop attack tree diagrams as a means to enhance understanding has helped to further highlight 
some of the unique security threats and risks that impact Facebook.  
The attack tree diagrams provide a formalised method for understanding security threats and permits you to look 
beyond the high level threats and also consider the subsystems. This provides a greater understanding of the 
threats which is incredibly important, as noted by Schneier (1999), “Security is not a product -- it's a process. 
Attack trees form the basis of understanding that process”. There are a number of advantages of the attack tree 
diagram approach, which include: 
 
 The attack tree diagram allows the modelling of complex security threats  to generate greater 
understanding; 
 The attack tree diagram allows for security threats to be broken down into their sub- components, again 
enhancing understanding; 
 The approach allows for the linkage between threats and security countermeasures and directly 
identifies the link between a countermeasure and the specific threat within the attack tree diagram. 
The study has also identified some weaknesses in the attack tree approach, these include: 
 The approach does not factor in the likelihood of an attack type, e.g. Pharming was not included in the 
analysis because of the extremely low likelihood of this being a threat related to the Facebook site; 
 The approach does not factor in temporal issues, for example, a reflection of the time needed for social 
engineering attacks or the speed of online automated attacks. 
Whilst SNS’s continue to become the most powerful and popular Web 2.0 components, complex security threats 
will continue to increase. Not only are the traditional Internet based attacks still relevant but novel new 
techniques utilising social engineering tactics are also being observed. It is important that security professionals 
have the ability to develop organisational solutions. These solutions need to have the ability to understand 
security situations, the ability to map and react to complex security threats, and ensure that proposed security 
solutions are cohesive and comprehensive. Attack tree diagrams can go a long way to achieving this aim through 
their simple design, reusability and their ability to promote discussion not just on completion but as a part of the 
development process. 
CONCLUSION 
This study has identified that attack tree diagrams can be used to understand and model security issues of very 
complex systems, such as social networking systems. This study has also created opportunities for future 
research, e.g. the analysis and comparison of attack tree diagrams of other social networking sites such as 
Twitter or MySpace. 
 
It is clear that SNS’s have become a favorite target of hackers (Gostev, 2008) due to the potential for fraudulent 
earnings through the use of malware and spam. With the ever growing number of users availing themselves of 
the benefits of SNS’s (Facebook (2011) reports its 500 millionth user in 2011) the need for a greater 
understanding and cohesive documenting of the attacks against SNS’s is paramount to be able to progress further 
and plan countermeasures. By gaining an understanding of the security risks associated with social networking 
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